
Class. 
Book. 



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■ [5 k.1 



£■ _5 I n " FRE MONT'S HUNDRED DAYS IN MIS SOURI." 

.r543 

SPEECH 



OF 



HON. F. P. BLAIR, JR., OF MISSOURI, 



ON 



FREMONT'S DEFENSE; 



DELIVERED 



IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 7, 1862, 



WASHINGTON: 
PRINTED AT THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE OFFICE. 

1862. 



speech of his aid-de-camp, the member from Indi- 
ana, [Mr. Shanks,] made in this House the other 
day. This speech and statement inaugurate a new 
campaign, and in a new and more congenial field, 
to be fouglit with new weapons, far different from 
the rude instruments of war with which General 
Fremont has been so unsuccessful. It is a cam- 
paign of proclamations, the only weapons which, 
up to this time, he seems to have used with effect. 
I commend his choice of weapons. His procla- 
mations will not help the enemy as much as he did 
by supplying them with arms at his isolated and 
unsupported positions at Lexington and else- 
where, nor will his proclamations injure the Gov- 
ernment in its struggle to put down rebellion one 
tithe as much as one single contract oFJiis making 
for condemned arms or for useless earthworks. 

The statement made by General Fremont is ex- 
traordinary both in its character and in the man- 
ner in which it was made public. I do not believe, 
after the statements upon this floor the other day 
by authority of the committee on the conduct of 
the war, that its publication was sanctioned by 
them. 

Mr. GOOCH. As that testimony has been 
made public, I feel bound to state, with the per- 
mission of the gentleman from Missouri, the ac- 
tion of the committee on the conduct of the war 
in reference to it. 

General Fremont came before the committee the 
same as all other witnesses that appeared before 
us. The committee deemed it essential that they 
should inquire into Uie conduct of the war in the 
western department, and for that purpose begun, 
as they have begun inaliotherdepartments, where 
it has been possible for them to do so, by bring- 
ing before them first the general in command of 
the department. 

When he appeared before the committee he pro- 
duced certain documents, from which he said the 
committee could select such parts as they deemed 
material. It was suggested by the chairman of 
thie committee — and in that the whole committee 
agreed — that General Fremont had better make a 
concise statement in writing, such as he wished to 
make in reference to the conduct of the war in his 
department. He did so; and when that statement 
was submitted these documents were submitted 
with it. They were not, liowever, received by 
the committee with the understanding tliat all of 
them were to be published in the report the com- 
mittee were to make to Congress, but only such 
parts as they should deem material to the investi- 
gation which they had been instructed to make. 
At a subsequent time General Fremont appeared 
before the committee, and certain questions were 
asked him, in relation to the western department, 
which he answered. When General Fremont left 
the committee room he was requested by the com- 
mittee, as all other witnesses have been, to give no 
information to any one of what he had stated to 
the committee. With that request I understood 
him to comply, the same as all other witnesses 
have done. 

I only wish to say further, that the testimony 
was published without the knowledge or consent 
of the committee; and I will add that I do not be- 
lieve that under any circumstances the committee 



would have fell it to be their duty to have reported 
to Congress all the letters and telegraphic dis- 
patches which were laid before them, because they 
would have considered that some of them would 
throw no light u^on the investigation which the 
committee was making, and ought, from their very 
character, to be suppressed. 

Mr. BLAIR, of Missouri. I ask the gentleman 
if all General Fremont's testimony is published.' 

Mr. GOOCH. The written statement and the 
letters and dispatches which he gave to the com- 
■hiiltee are published, but not that part of his test- 
imony which was in response to interrogatories 
propounded to him by the committee. He did not 
give to the committee the original letters and dis- 
patches, but copies of them, and said that he 
would furnish the originals when we desired them. 
He had no copy of that part of his testimony 
which was in response to interrogatories, and 
therefore could not publish that. 

Mr. BLAIR, of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, the 
character of this statement is as extraordinary as 
the manner in which it has found its way before 
the public. It is an apology for disaster and de- 
feat; ingenious upon its face by the omission of 
important facts, and by the suggestion of others 
which never existed. It proves him to be a much 
better apologist for the defeats which he suffered, 
than he is a general to achieve victories. One of 
his aids-de-camp, a gentleman distinguished as 
a literary man, has also published an account of 
his campaign in Missouri, in one of our popular 
magazines, under the title of" Fremont's Hundred 
Days in Missouri," thereby challenging compari- 
son with the far-famed campaign of Bonaparte. 
Is there anything in this campaign, as portrayed 
by the general himself, and by his several aids- 
de-camp, that resembles, except in the number of 
days, the historic campaign of the first Napoleon? 
Can imagination conceive of Bonaparte returning 
to Paris, and announcing that he had lost two 
armies, liberated two negroes, and published a 
bombastic proclamation . 

It is known, Mr. Chairman, that I took an 
interest in the elevation of General Fremont to 
his present rank and recent command in the 
Army. I do not suppose that my recommenda- 
tion aided him in securing him that position, 
l)Ut it shows the good feeling I entertained for 
him, and the confidence I had in him at the time. 
I should have rejoiced in his success in the de- 
partment over which he was placed. I had been 
his friend for many years, and my whole fam- 
ily lind been most friendly to liim and to his fam- 
ily. The kindest relations had always existed be- 
tween us. I should have rejoiced in his success, 
not only on account of the great public cause in 
which we were both engaged, but also on account 
of my personal interest in him. I recommended 
him in the belief that he would serve the great 
public interest, and when I found he was incom- 
petent to serve that cause, I recommended his re- 
moval upon the same public considerations, and 
with no other feelings than those of humiliation 
and regret. There is nothing in the letter that I 
addressed to my brother, the Postmaster General, 
and through him to the President, that shows that 
I had one particle of feeling against him. The 



conviction which was forced upon me, came with 
i^iief and mortification, such as I have never be- 
fore experienced. My jiHly;ment, iiniiiflucnced 
by any motives except tiiose for the pul)lic e-ood, 
compelled me to the conclusion that General Fre- 
mont was unfitted for the conmiand of that depart- 
ment. I never had any private griefs against iiim 
of any kind. I never asked anything of him for 
myself, because there was nothing I desired that 
I could have obtained by his aid, which I could 
not just as well have oijtained without it. 1 never 
asked for anything for others, tha^ he did not 
cheerfully assent to, and, so far as it was in his 
power, grant. 

Fremont's apology for x-ot rein-forcing lyon. 
Now, sir, I jiave read with attention the state- 
ment he has made through the press, and I have 
read also the speech of the gentleman from In- 
diana, [Mr.Sii.wKs,] who followed him to Spring- 
field as an aid-de-camp, and I can find nothingm 
either to justify the enthusiasm which that gen- 
tleman seems to feel over a sad record of defeats 
and unvaried disasters. The one isa tame apology, 
the other a sort of frothy rhetoric and confused 
declamation. There are two great points which 
will forcverstand outin relief in the history of those 
hundred days, the saddest days that ever befdl the 
loyal men of that State, which no rhetoric and no 
studied obscurity of expression can slii^ld from 
view or make the nation forget. Those two great 
points of public interest upon which the sad eyes 
of the nation will always be fixed, are Springfield 
and Lexington; the fields where the heroic Lyon 
fell, and where iVlulligan yielded, not to the foe, 
but to famine and thirst. What had the gentle- 
man from Indiana [Mr. Shavks] to say about 
them > Absolutely nothing ! What has General 
Fremont said about them in his statement.' He 
treads lightly on that ground. The other histo- 
rian, who has chosen a popular magazine for his 
forum, finds little lime to bestow upon them. But 
I will do General Fremont the justice to quote his 
own language: 

'• From St. Louis to Ciiiro was an casv davV joiirncv by 
water, and traiis-portation abundant. To Hprin'-tulil was a 
weok's triarch, and before I could have reached it, (.'alio 
would have bvx-n taken, and with it, I believe. .St. Loui--. 
On mv arrival at Cairo, I found the force under General 
I remiss reduced to one thousand two hundred men, con- 
sisting mainly of a regiment which had agreed to awiiitmy 

"A few miles below, at New Madrid, General Pillow had 
landed a torce estimated at twentv thousand, which sub- 
sequent events showed was not exajferated. Our force 
greatly increased to the enemy bv rumors, drove him to a 
hasty retreat, and peimanently secured the nosiiioii. 'J'o 
tliese facts the .accompaiiyinp papers and the testimony of 
General Prentiss and other officers is offered to the coiii- 
mitice. 

" r returned to .<t. Louis on the -Ith August, havin" in the 
mean time ordered Colonel Slevenson's regimenf, from 
Boonov.lle, and Colonel Montgomery, from Kansas, to 
march to the relief of General Lyon. 

" Immediately upon my return from Cairo, I set inv--elf 
to work, amid incessant demands upon my time from every ' 
quarter, principally to provide n.inforcements for General 

'• I do not accept .'Springfield as a disaster belonging to mv 
administration. Causes wholly out of my jurisdiction hail I 
alre.idy prepared the def.'rft of General Lion before my ar- ' 
rival at M. Louis. His letter to me of tlie'tfth August, with 
other papers annexed, will show that I was already in com- 
munication with liim, and that he knew his wants were 



being provided for. It will be seen that I had nil reasona- 
ble expcctntions of being able to relieve him In time, and 
had he been able to adhere to the course indieatiHl in his 
letter, a very short time would have found him eirieienlly 
sustained." 

WAS CAIRO OR SPRINGFIELD THE POINT TO BE FIRST 
.REINFORCED.' 

His defense for not succoring Lyon at Spring- 
field is that Cairo was threatened; that it was an 
easy day 's journey from St. Louis by water, and 
transportation abundant; that Lyon was at Spring- 
field, a week's march from St. Louis, and that 
he does not accept Lyon's defeat as belonging to 
his administration. Now, I undertake to say, 
that it is true Cairo was within an easy day's 
journey from St. Louis by water, and less by rail- 
road, that it could be reached from Springfield, 
Illinois, as easily and in as short a time. From In- 
dianapolis, the capital of Indiana, from Columbus, 
Ohio, from almost any point in any of the north- 
western States, Cairo was not more than an easy 
day's journey by water or by railroad. It was 
and is, the point of all others, most accessible to 
the en tire North west, and easily reinforced. It was 
also intrenched, defended by eight thousand men, 
and with ordnance of the heaviest caliber. Gen- 
eral Prentiss had as many men as Lyon and more, 
as shown by their statements, accompanyin^Gen- 
eral Fremont's defense. McCrilloch and >rice, 
according to Fremont's statenWit, had one third 
more men to attack Lyon than Pillow iiad to as- 
sail Cairo, as it was then said he was threatenino- 
to do. Lyon was without fortifications and with" 
out heavy guns, Prentiss had both at Cairo, and 
that place was covered by two rivers in front, and 
could not have been assailed without crossing 
them, which it was utterly impossible for the 
enemy to do, in ftice of an army to oppose them. 
It is pretended and attempted to he shown by 
a dispatch from General Prentiss, that his army, 
consisting of six " three months"and two " lluee 
years" regiments, was about to be disbanded, 
and the statement of General Prentiss is left un- 
explained, and the argument boldly advanced 
that without reinforcements he could liave had 
but two regiments left to defend the post. The 
truth of the matter is, as shown by General Pren- 
tiss in a subsequent dispatch, that these six 
"three months" regiments were then in process 
of reorganization; and I say they did not disband, 
but reentered the service almost in a body for 
the war. Cook's regimenj, Oglesby'a regiment, 
McArthur's regiment, the regiment originally 
raised by Prentiss, were all "three months" 
men. They remained in the service; they re- 
mained at Cairo, and the other two regiments 
of " three months" men, whose oames 1 do not 
now remember, remained also, and all have since 
made their names illustrious at the siege of Fort 
Donelson. But if a portion of Prentiss's com- 
mand were " three moiiths" men, so also were 
a majority of the troops under Lyon's command, 
at Sjiringfield. • Springfield was a week's march 
from St. Louis, and was capable of bcin"- rein- 
forced only from that point. Yet General Fre- 
mont believed and acted upon the belief that 
Cairo, threatened by Pillow with twenty thou- 
sand men, was the point to be reinforced, although 
it was strongly intrenched, garrisoned by ei>^ht 



6 



regiments, defended by guns of the heaviest cali- 
ber, wiiii the Ohio and Mississippi rivers in front, 
and capable of being reinforced within twenty- 
four hours from any part of the entire Northwest; 
and that Lyon at Springfield, ihreatencd by thirty 
thousand men, having under his command a less 
force than that at Cairo, with no intreiichments, 
with no heavy guns, with no natural defenses in- 
terposed between him and the enemy, a week's 
march from St. Louis, from which point alone it 
could be effectually reinforced, was to be left to 
his fate, or to be left to wait until Cairo, naturally 
so much stronger, and with its artificial defenses 
so much better, so much more easily reinforced, 
and defended by more men, should first be at- 
tended to. This is the amplification of his own 
argument. Let him be judged on his own state- 
ment. 

So thoroughly was he possessed by this idea 
that he seems utterly to liave forgotten Lyon and 
Springfield until the 3d day of August, nine days 
after his arrival in Missouri. A messenger came 
from Lyon repeating the sad story of his distress 
and peril, which was forwarded to Cairo, and Gen- 
eral Fremont on that day telegrajtlied an order to 
Stevenson at Booneville and Colonel Montgomery 
at Leavenworth in Kansas, ordering them to rein- 
force Lyon with their regiments. These two reg- 
iments were probably tiie two of all others in his 
command the farthest from Springfield by the 
routes which they would be compelled to take, and 
in positions the most difficult to supply them im- 
mediately with transportation. This is literally 
all that Fremont ever did to reinforce Lyon. You 
may search his statement — every letter, every tel- 
egram, and every document — and you will find 
no other order given. He makes tlie distress of 
Lyon the pretext for the purchase of condemned 
arms', but he made no effort of any kind except 
the orders given to Stevenson and to Montgomery, 
to relieve Lyon's distress, and he provided neither 
Stevenson nor Montgomery with transportation 
to enable them to carry out the order of relief. If 
lie had provided the transportation for these two 
regiments, they could not have reached Lyon in 
time, although both could certainly have done so 
had he made the order on his first arrival in Mis- 
souri. He had other regiments in his command 
which could have reached Lyon and reinforced 
him, even if ordered as late as the 3d of August. 
For instance, Wyman's regiment, thirteenth Illi- 
nois, tiien at RoUa, and (hirty-six hundred other 
men, as shown by the report of Colonel Chester 
Harding, jr., to have been at the arsenal and Jef- 
ferson barracks on the 5th day of August, of which 
Coler's Illinois regiment is stated by him to be 
the only one not ready for service. 

In this place I desire to allude to the assertions 
of General Fremont and of Colonel Chester Hard- 
ing, jr., to the effect that the force which Pillow is 
said to have had, and with which he was threaten- 
ing to assault and take Cairo, was denionstrated by 
subsequent events not to have been over-estimated. 
Well, sir, if subsequent events have demonstrated 
that fact, they have been very unfortunate in not 
pointing to a single one of them. Neither of them 
point to anything that has occurred that justifies 
any such statement; and, in my opinion, there was 



good reason forthis singular reserve on their parts 
Months afterwards, when the battle was fought 
at Belmont, it was not supposed by any one that 
there were twenty thousand men at Columbus, 
under command of General Polk, who had then 
taken the place formerly held by Pillow. It lias 
not been shown, by anything that will pass for 
evidence, that there were twenty thousand men at 
Columbus the other day when it was evacuated. 
The tact that Pillow retired when the reinforce- 
ments went forward under Fremont, would go to 
show that Pillow did not consider himself very 
strong at that time, and the fact that no demon- 
stration has since that time been made against 
Cairo, are among the " subsequent events" that 
do not strengthen their assertions. It is the opin- 
ion of many well-informed persons that the move- 
ment towards Cairo at that time, as well as the 
demonstration under Hardee against Iron Mount- 
ain, were mere feints to draw off reinforcements 
from Lyon, in order that he might be overwhelmed 
by the superior force brought against him under 
Price and McCulloch. The general and the ad- 
jutant general who had been deceived by such a 
ruse would be among the last to admit that they 
had been outwitted, although the fact that no 
serious attack nor even a demonstration in that 
quarter, lias since been made will go far to con- 
vince impartial jjersons that the enemy in that 
quarter weiie standing on the defensive, and their 
heavy fortifications at Columbus will be almost 
conclusive. I leave this branch of 'the case. I 
think I have made it appear that it was not Fre- 
mont's first duty to reinforce Cairo in preference 
to Springfield, but I am willing for the sake of the 
argument to admit that he was correct in his judg- 
ment upon this point. It is a matter of opinion, 
and will always be a matter of opinion, whether 
he should have taken that course or not. I am 
willing that upon the facts of the case — n'ot, how- 
ever, upon his statement of facts— the country 
shall judge his conduct upon this point. 

FREMONT HAD AMPLE FORCE TO REIXFORCE BOTH 
CAIRO AND SPRINGFIELD. 

There remains, however, another branch of this 
case, which is not a matter of opinion, but a ques- 
tion of fact, upon which I take issue with him. It 
is the statement that he had not sufficient force 
under hia command with which to reinforce both 
Cairo and General Lyon at Springfield. It is 
perfectly evident that he had enough to reinforce 
Cairo, for that was done, and the enemy fled be- 
fore his grand flotilla. I will undertake to prove 
that he had enough also, after he had reinforced 
Cairo, to have reinforced Lyon; and that he had 
ample notice of Lyon's peril, and ample time in 
which to forward reinforcements. I premise by 
saying that it is curious that he should have 
omitted, when he stated that he had not sufficient 
force lor both of these objects, to state also the 
force which he then had under his command. 

The statement which I shall make is not derived 
from the books in the Adjutant General's office, 
for I have had no access to them. General Fre- 
mont probably has those books, or at least all the 
data which embrace the returns of tlie number of 
troops in his own department. My knowledge is 



derived from my own early connection with the 
organization of troops in the department, from my 
association witii them since, and from scattered 
items of information which I have l)cun able to 
glean from tiie studied obscurity of General Fre- 
mont's own statements and the documents an- 
nexed to it. 

There was, on the day of arrival of General 
Fremont in Missouri, sixteen full Missouri regi- 
ments in the service of the United States. They 
were as follows: 

First regiment Missouri volunteers, Colonel F. 
P. Blair, at Sjiringfield. 

Second regiment Missouri volunteers. Colonel 
Boernstein. 

Third regiment Missouri volunteers, Colonel 
Sigel, at Springfield. 

Fourth regiment Missouri volunteers. Colonel 
Schuttner. 

Fifth regiment Missouri volunteers. Colonel 
Saloman, at Springfield. 

Of these, the first regiment was the only three 
years' regiment. 

The sixth regiment Missouri volunteers. Col- 
onel Bland, at Ironton. 

Seventh regiment Missouri volunteers. Colonel 
Stevenson, at Boone ville. 

Eighth regiment Missouri volunteers, Colonel 
Smith, in Warren county, Missouri. 

Ninth regiment Missouri volunteers. Colonel 
Fredericks, at St. Louis. 

Tenth regiment Missouri volunteers. Colonel 
Bayles, at or near St. Louis. 

I find Colonel Schasflfer's regiment, which I be- 
lieve to be the eleventh regiment Missouri volun- 
teers, is noticed in the Missouri Democrat with 
that of Bayle's and Frederick's, as being armed 
and equipped, and under marching orders on the 
Gth day of August. In addition to these, the five re- 
served corps regiments — Almstedt's, Kalmann's, 
McNeil 's. Brown 's, and Stifel 's — were then in the 
service, fully armed and equipped, and stationed 
at different points in Missouri. There were four 
Kansas regiments in his department — Dietzler's 
and Mitchell's, the first and second, then witli 
General Lyon; the third and fourth regiments, 
Montgomery's and Wecr's, one at Leavenworth, 
the other at Fort Scott, on the boundary between 
Missouri and Kansas, about sixty or seventy 
miles from Sj^ringfield. There were at that time 
four Iowa regiments in the State of Missouri, the 
first under Bates at Springfield, the second (Cur- 
tis) at Jefferson barracks, the third (Williams) 
on the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad; there 
was one other in the State, and three others, mak- 
ing seven regiments in all, in Iowa, and ready 
for service; two of which, the sixth and seventh 
regiments, reached Jefferson barracks on the 11th 
of August, and a battalion of the Iowa fifth was 
at the arsenal, St. Louis, on August 10; three com- 
panies of the Iowa fourth arrived ip St. Louis on 
the 11th of August. There were eighteen Illi- 
nois regiments in the service and under his com- 
mand. These regiments were numbered from sev- 
enth to twenty-fourth inclusive; sixof these were 
"three months" men, which I have already 
named as being at Cairo in the command of Gen- 
eral Prentiss, almost the whole body of which 



were reorganized and reentered the service, and 
are now leading the column of victory in Tennes- 
see. There were ten other.-?, " three years " men, 
numbered from thirteenth to twenty-fourth, in- 
clusive, fully armed and equipped, all in active 
service, mostly in Missouri, and all under Fre- 
mont's command. These ten regiments had been 
authorized by the Legislature of Illinois to be 
raised by the Governor in anticipation of a call 
by the President. There were one thousand reg- 
ular troops under Lyon at Springfield, as will ap- 
pear from the statement of the adjutant general. 
Captain Kulton, which is among the documents 
published in Fremont's papers. These consisted 
of cavalry, artillery, and infantry. Tiiere were 
also three companies of regulars at Leavenworth. 
There was a battalion of four hundred home 
guards at St. Joseph underColonel Pcabody, who 
was afterwards severely wounded in the siege of 
Lexington. There were three hundred underMa- 
i ir Hunt at Hannibal, and three hundred at Kan- 
sas City under Major , who was also subse- 
quently wounded at Lexington; there were also 
one hundred and fifty at Booneville, under a gal- 
lant officer, who afterwards defended that city 
with liis small force and dispersed eight hundred 
rebels. Tiie Nebraska regiment of four hundred 
and fifty-seven men reached St. Louis on the 13th 
or 14th of August. 

This statement shows that there were forty -four 
regiments in the western department armed and 
equipped when General Fremont arrived there and 
took the command. On the 4th of August Gov- 
ernor Morton of Indiana telegraphed to General 
Fremont, as appears from his dispatch annexed to 
Fremont's statement, offering him five regiments. 
Surely these regiments could have been made avail- 
able for the defense of Cairo, if any serious attack 
had been made on that position , and although they 
were not in the western department the Govern- 
ment would not have hesitated to have given him 
this force if Cairo had been attacked. The Gov- 
ernment did consent to his taking those regiments, 
for they arrived in St. Louis on or about the 17th 
of August, and were soon followed by three other 
regiments and several batteries of artillery from 
tl'.at State, all of which have since served with 
distinction in Missouri. 

I propose now to show something as to the par- 
ticular location of the troops actually in his de- 
partment at the time of Fremont's arrival in Mis- 
souri, and to prove that he not only had the men 
to reinforce Cairo and to succor Lyon, but that 
they were in position to be available to him for 
those purposes. I read from a letter addressed to 
me by Colonel John M. Palmer, fourteenth Illi- 
nois volunteers, now a brigadier general, who is 
well known to every member of this House from 
the State of Illinois: 

St. Louis, JVoicmAcr 23, 1861. 

Dear Sir: On Ihc 5tli of July, 1861, the fourteenth regi- 
ment Illinois volunteers (nine hundred strong) crossed tlic 
Mississippi river, and on the 13lli moved from Hannibal to 
Macon City, and remaining there and at Uenich and Stur- 
geon, on the North Missouri railroad, until the 'Jth of Au- 
gust, and on the lOth reached JctTiTson barracks. 

When this regiment left Hannibal, the third Iowa and 
the sixteenth Illinois were on the line of the Hannibal and 
St. Joseph railroad. On the IJtIi July, Colonel Turchln's 
Illinois regiment came into the State of Missouri. On the 



8 



I4t1), Colonel Grant's twenty-first Illinois was at Palmyra, 
atwiiich place Colonel Turehin was stationed. On the 31st 
July, I found at Mexico Colonel Marshall's first Illinois 
cavalry and one battalion of the fifteenth Illinois, Colonel 
Hacker's regiment having left the same place a few days 
before. 

During the month of July the following regiments were 
in North Missouri and within twenty-four hours of St. 
Louis: 

Fourteenth Illinois volunteers, (Palmer,) 900 men. 

Si.xteenth Illinois volunteers, (.Smith,) say 800 " 

Nineteenth Illinois volunteers, (Turehin,) say.. 800 " 
Fifteenth Illinois volunteers, (Turner,) say.... 800 " 
Twenty-first Illinois volunteers, (Grant,) say. .. 800 " 

First Illinois cavalry, (Marshall,) say 600 " 

Twenty-fourth Illinois volunteers, (Hecker,) say 900 " 
Third Iowa volunteers, (Williams,) say 700 " 

Total .6,300 men. 

All these regiments were then full, and the estimate of 
their actual strength is low. 

Very truly, Sic, J. M. PALMER. 

Colonel F. P. Blair. 

P. S. If it be inquired what all these regiments were 
doing, the answer is, eating their rations and holding the 
railroads. J. M. PALMER. 

I annex a statement, also, of the number and des- 
ignation of troops taken by General Fremont to 
reinforce Cairo, and it will be seen that of the 
whole number of sixty-three hundred men, con- 
tained in the list of General Palmer above, there 
was but one regiment of these taken to Cairo — 
Colonel Turehin 's — leaving fifty-five hundred men 
within twenty-four hours of St. Louis, available, 
when Fremont first arrived in St. Louis, to rein- 
force Lyon: 

List of troops taken by General Frimont to Cairo, August 
1, 1661. 

" Nineteenth Illinois regiment. Colonel Turehin, armed 
with Minies. 

" Seventeenth Illinois regiment. 

" Rombauer's home guard, composed of one battalion of 
Almstedt's and one of Kalmann's of the first and second 
United States reserve corps — eleven hundred strong. 

" Second Iowa regiment, formerly Curtis's, and Captain 
Buell's battery of six pieces; eight steamboats; Fremont 
and staff in four carriages, the City of Alton steamboat being 
especially devoted to the general and his staff." 

This statement is imade from the columns of the 
St. Louis Democrat. 

In addition to the regiments mentioned in the 
schedule of Colonel Palmer within easy reach of 
Fremont, there was the thirteenth Illinois regi- 
ment, Colonel Wyman, at Rolla; Colonel Steven- 
son's regiment, at Booneville; Weer's regiment, at 
Fort Scott, in Kansas, sixty or seventy miles from 
Springfield, and Colonel Montgomery's regiment 
at Leavenworth, Kansas, all of which could have 
reached Springfield before the lOih of August, and 
in time to have reinforced Lyon. There were other 
regiments, including Bayle's, Frederick's, Shaef- 
fer's, Smith's and Coler's, then at or near St. 
Louis, which regiments I presume are included in 
the statement of Colonel Chester Harding, jr., as 
comprising the thirty-six hundred men in the St. 
Louis arsenal on tlte 5th of August. As the regi- 
ments not named by him in his statement are enu- 
merated in the Republican newspaper of St. Louis 
as being at the arsenal, and under marching or- 
ders, on the 6th of August. From this statement 
it is very clear that there were ten thousand men 
fully armed and equipped which might have been 
used to reinforce Lyon, if General Fremont had 
had the capacity to appreciate the difficulties sur- 



rounding Lyon, instead of making those difficul- 
ties an excuse for his purchase of Austrian guns, 
and breaking down under that effort for his relief, 
and making no other movement, and giving no . 
other order for that purpose, except the order to 
move two regiments, the only regiments at that 
time among those I have enumerated, whose posi- 
tions made it impossible they should reach Lyon 
by the 10th of August. He not only made no 
other effort, but, so far from it, transportation 
which was at Rolla, and which might have been 
used to forward troops to Springfield if Fremont 
had had any intention of sending them, was on 
the 4th of August discharged from service at Rolla 
and brought back to St. Louis. 

FREMONT HAD NOTICE OF LTON's DISTRESS, AND SUF- 
FICIENT TIME TO FORWARD REINFORCEMENTS. 

1 assert that Fremont had notice of Lyon's 
perilous condition before he left the city of New 
York for St. Louis. I received a dispatch from 
General Lyon while I was in Washington during 
the extra session of Congress, on or about the 
18ih of July, stating that Price was advancing 
upon him with a force of thirty thousand men, 
and that he would be overwhelmed unless rein- 
forced. My brother, Montgomery Blair, trans- 
mitted that message to General Fremont in New 
York, urging him at the same time to proceed to 
the West. When General Fremont arrived at 
St. Louis he was met by a messenger from Gen- 
eral Lyon, Major Barnard G. Farrar, attached to 
Lyon's staff, who came from Lyon with urgent 
entreaties for reinforcements. Captain John S. 
Cavender, of the first regiment Missouri volun- 
teers, also came from Lyon upon the same errand, 
and returned, and was afterwards wounded at the 
battle of Wilson's Creek. ColonelJohn S.Phelps, 
a member of this House from the Springfield dis- 
trict, made the same statements to Fremont, and 
placed in his hands a written statement from Gen- 
eral Lyon, which will be found among the docu- 
ments attached to Fremont's defense, in which 
Lyon said that Missouri would be devastated 
unless he was reinforced. Fremont, therefore, 
had ample knowledge of the position in which 
Lyon stood. He had that knowledge when he 
left' New York, and it was repeated to him in 
the most urgent terms when he arrived in St. 
Louis. He seems to have disregarded it alto- 
gether, and to have paid no attention to the wants 
of Lyon until the 3d of August. It does not 
appear that he even opened communication with 
Lyon until his return from Cairo. Lyon's letter 
of August 9, in response to one from Fremont, 
does not disclose any encouragement held out to 
him by Fremont's letter, to which his is in reply. 
Fremont's letter to Lyon is not published, for 
some reason best known to himself. He has 
favored the public with a great many of his letters 
upon matters wholly immaterial, and has chosen 
to keep back this letter, which might have dis- 
closed what his views were at that time, and what 
his intentions were with regard to reinforcing 
Lyon. I know of no subject connected with 
General Fremont's career which at this moment 
would have so much interest for the public. 

He says that Lyon had the assurance that he was 



9 



doing everything ho could for him. If he had that 
assurance, it is more than anybody else has been 
able to discover. If he had, it is more than he has 
attempted to prove by this record; for this record 
shows that he took no notice of Lyon until the .'W 
of August, nine days after his arrival in St. Louis, 
although I have shown that he had ample force 
under his command, in addition to tliat which he 
sent to Cairo. The only remaining question is, 
whether there was time, in the ]ieriod intervening 
between the 25th of July, the date of his arrival 
in St. Louis, and the 10th of August, when the 
btittle was fought, to draw in his forces and send 
them to reinforce Lyon. From St. Louis to Rolla, 
by railroad, the distance isoneliundred and eleven 
miles; from Rolla to Springfield, one hundred and 
fifteen miles, with a road firm and liard, though 
rough and broken. Sigel,in his first expedition to 
Springfield, made the same distance in much less 
time than fifteen days. The distance has been 
traversed before and since by large armies, in 
much less time, and we have General Fremont's 
own authority for saying that Springfield is only 
a week's march from St. Louis. 

WHY FREMONT MADE NO EFFORT TO SUCCOR LYON, 
AND WHY LYON DETERMINED TO FIGHT THE BAT- 
TLE OF SPRINGFIELD. 

I am willing to rest the case here. I think that 
I have proven that he had ample notice, ample 
time, and ample force with which to have relieved 
Lyon; but the difficulty was that he had no ap- 
preciation ofLyon's condition. He told Governor 
Gamble, of Missouri, who went to him to urge 
upon him the necessity of sending forward rein- 
forcements, that Lyon was stronger than anybody 
else upon his line. If further proof were needed 
it would be found in the fact, that immediately 
upon the receipt of the news of the battle of Spring- 
field he sent forward Palmer's and Turner's regi- 
ments, and two other regiments, all of which 
reached Rolla within three days after the news 
of the battle, and all of which might have been 
sent on the first day he arrived in St. Louis. The 
pretext now put up by himself for not sending 
them, and which is also to be found in the certifi- 
cate given him by Colonel Chester Harding, jr., 
was that they were required in northeast Missouri 
to prevent an uprising of the rebels. The fact is, 
that these troops were withdrawn from northeast 
Missouri before the battle of Springfield, Palmer's 
regiment arriving in St. Louis on the lOth of Au- 
gust, and there was no organized body of secession- 
ists there when Fremontarrived in the State, and 
Palmer, in his letter above quoted, states: " If it 
be inquired what all these regiments were doing, 
the answer is, eating their rations and holding the 
railroads." Everybody knows that these troops 
could have been better spared from northeast Mis- 
souri, or indeed from any other ytart of the State 
before the battle of Springfield, than they could 
afterwards, because that event inspired the rebels 
with hope and confidence, and set them to organ- 
izing all over the State. The sum total of his at- 
tempts to succor Lyon may be thus stated. He 
made no effort at all until it was too late. He 
ordered two regiments forward, but made no ar- 
rangements for transportation; and that these two 



regiments, so ordered, had the leas^ chance of get- 
ting to Springfield in time. 

It was under these circumstances that Lyon was 
forced , by the condition in which he found himself, 
to engage the enemy tw<Mity-th ree thousand strong, 
with his force of less than five thousand men, in one 
of the most sanguinary and deadly confiicts that 
ever took place on this continent, and which re- 
sulted in a victory and driving the enemy from 
the field. After the battle was over and the enemy 
had disappeared from sight, it was discovered that 
during tlie tremendous struggle which tln'y had 
endured, the ammunition of our forces had been 
almost entirely expended, and they had suffered 
so much that it was not possible, if the enemy 
should return and renew the attack, for them to 
hold their ground, and therefore they retired un- 
molested. They were never pursued. The enemy 
showed no disposition to engage them again. 
They plundered the bodies of the slain, but never 
attacked the remnant of Lyon's army. Fremont 
has done injustice to the men who at Springfield 
risked everything for their country, by speaking 
of it as a defeat. It was a disaster, but no defeat. 
In the opinion of Lyon and his officers, to attack the 
enemy was the only way in which the army could 
be saved, it being unsupported and beyond the 
hope of any succor. If they had attempted to re- 
treat over the broken roads, through the defiles and 
forests to Rolla, the enemy having a large force of 
cavalry, would have harassed them and cut them 
off, especially as they would have been embar- 
rassed and impeded by the large numbers of Union 
men fleeing with their wives and children. Gen- 
eral Lyon thought his best course was to attack 
the enemy in front. He did attack them and lost 
his life, but saved hi.s army and won a victory. 
That victory did not bear fruit, but that was not 
the fault of the general who ordered the battle or 
the men who fought and won it; it was the fault 
of another. The battle need not to have been 
fought that day, if there had been any hope of suc- 
cor; it might have been delayed possibly for a 
week. It was simply because Lyon, as he then 
stated, considered himself abandoned, and was 
hopeless of receiving reinforcements, and felt that 
this was the only road to safety, that the battle was 
fought. 

CAPTURE OF MULLIGAN AT LEXINGTON. 

The next point to which I shall ask the atten- 
tion of the House is the siege and fall of Lexing- 
ton, the most disastrous blow which the Union 
cause has received in the whole war, if we regard 
it in the aspect of the number of prisoners taken, 
and the number of arms, munitions of war, stores, 
money, and other valuables lost to the Govern- 
ment and captured by the enemy. The number 
of killed and wounded on our side was not very 
large, and did not exceed two hundred men, but 
the enemy took three thousand prisoners, upwards 
of one thousand horses, three thousand stand of 
small arms, four heavy guns, wagons, stores, and 
munitions of war, and nearly half a million of dol- 
lars in money. General Fremont says that the 
first news he received of Price's advance upon 
Lexington was on the 12th of September, tln' day 
of Mulligan's arrival at that place. The fact is, 



10 



that it hiid been known for weeks that Price was 
advancing into that part of the State, and Mulli- 
gan went to Lexington to take possession of it, 
and hold it, against Price's advance. The dis- 
patch of Mulligan, to which General Fremont re- 
fers to support his statement, proves simply that 
on the 12th of August he received news that'Pricc 
had arrived atWarrensburg, thirty-five miles dis- 
tant from Lexington, with an army estimated at 
from twelve to fifteen thousand. Two days after- 
wards Fremont made a statement of the forces 
under his command, whicii I here give: 

Headquarters Western Department, 

„, ., ,, . „ September 14,186}. 

lo ttif Hon. hiMON Cameron, 

Secretary of IVar, Washington, D. C. 
^ Subjoiiied is a list of our total forei;, with its distribution : 

fet. Louis, including home guard 6 899 

Under Brigadier General Pope, including home guard 5Aii3 

Lexington, including home guard ''400 

Jetierson City, one fourth home guard ..... .'.'."." ," " 9677 

!'""» ■.'.■ 4'700 

Ironton 3 057 

Cape Girardeau .'.'.'."..'.'."..".'.""" 'e'iO 

Bird's Point and Norfolk 3 510 

CJairo, including McClernand's brigade .... '. '. '. ... ' 48-^5 

Tort Holt, opposite Cairo, Kentucky shore '.'.'. 3595 

f'aducali 7 791 

Under General Lane.... .'.'.'.'.".'.'.'.'.'.*.'.'.' a'soo 

VIound City, near Cairo .'!';'.!.'.'!'.!! "'900 



rotal of present and absent on detached duty 55,693 

JOHN C. FRliMONT^ 

Major General Commanding. 

It will be seen from the above that, accordin"' 
his own showing, he had at the time nearly fifty"- 
IX thousand men under his command. 

[Here the hammer fell.] 

Mr. COLFAX. If the gentleman from Mis- 
oun lias not concluded his remarks, I hope he 
;fill be allowed to do so. 

No objection was made. 

Mr. BLAIPt, of Missouri. I am very much 
bhged to the committee and to the gentleman from 
ndiana for the courtesy which has been shown 
le. I am well satisfied that it could be shown 
lat Fremont had a larger force at this time. His 
djutant general. Captain McKeever, informed 
le, on or about the middle of October, one month 
Iter, that General Fremont had ujiwardsof ninety 
lousand men under his command in the depart- 
lent of the West; but I am content to take his 
wn statements. Mulligan was ordered to Lex- 
igton, to take and hold it until relieved. The 
ispatchcs which lie sent to Colonel Jefferson C. 
'avis, commanding at Jefferson City, and which 
•e annexed to Fremont's statement, show that 
ich were his instructions, for lie declares his 
termination to hold it, and asks that reinforce-, 
lents be sent to him. But for these instructions, 
3 could have saved his command by crossing the 
verin the two ferry-boats and a steamboat which 
y£\tthe landingof Lexington, and thus put the 
lissouri river between him and Price, who would | 
ive had no means of crossing over and follow- 
g him. He could thus have joined his forces 

those of Sturgis on the north side of the river, 
id made a stand against Price. But he was or- 
^red to iiold Lexington until relieved. He was 
nt there for that purpose and none other, and 
! obryed the order. When General Fremont 



gave that order, he must have had an opinion as 
to his ability to reinforce Mulligan in time; he 
must have supposed either that he was able or that 
he was not able to do it. If he believed he was 
aijle to do it, and then failed, the responsibility of 
giving such instructions, by which three thousand 
men with their arms, ammunition, equipments, 
munitions of war, and stores fell into the hands of 
the enemy, must rest upon him. If he gave such 
nistructions without believing that he could rein- 
force Mulligan in time, then the responsibility that 
rests upon him is unrelieved by any redee'minff 
feature. ^ 

This latter construction has been placed upon 
his conduct by two newspapers published in St. 
Louis, the Democrat and Republican, both advo- 
cates and apologists of his administration of the 
western department. The Democrat of September 
25, in announcing the fall of Lexington, and no- 
ticing the movements against Price's victorious 
army, says: 

"All look to the grand movement for the complete en- 
trapping of the rebel army under General Price, to the ac- 
complishment of which, we are disposed to believe, the 
capture of Colonel Mulligan was but one of the predeterm- 
ined necessities." 

The Republican contained an article of the 
same tenor. I take a different view of it. I do 
not think Fremont meditated the destruction of 
Mulligan. He doubtless believed he had the force 
to succor him, and he simply lacked the capacity 
to wield It. I point to the number of troops then 
under his command, and the positions they occu- 
pied, as shown by the statement of his adjutant 
general, which I have already quoted to prove 
that he had ample force, if he had known how to 
u.se it. Everybody in Missouri, prior to the fall 
of Lexington, friend and foe alike, believed that 
he would succeed in cutting off and destroying 
Price's army. 

The statement already referred to which I hold 
in my hand, shows that he had nearly seven thou- 
sand men in St. Louis; under General Pope, in 
North Missouri, five thousand four hundred; in 
Lexington, including the home guard, two thou- 
sand four hundred; (the real force in Lexington 
was three thousand;) at Jefferson City, nearly ten 
thousand men; at Rolla, four thousand seven hun- 
dred, and under General Lane, two thousand two 
hundred. All of these forces were within losa than 
a week's march of Lexington; all of them could 
have been brought to bear upon Lexington in less 
than a week; in all, upwards of thirty thousand 
men, armed and equipped. Mulligan held out for 
nine days. Price held possession for ten days of 
Lexington, after the capture of Mulligan, makino- 
in all nineteen days. The army with whicli he in° 
vested Lexington was reported at from ten to fif- 
teen thousand. He was reinforced by Harris and 
Green with five thousand men, who traversed the 
State from its eastern boundarv, crossing the river 
at Glasgow and reaching Lexington before its fall, 
traveling the whole distance i)y land, and aidin" 
in its capture. In the mean time. General Fre"- 
mont, with the railroads at his command to carry 
his troops within sixty miles of Lexington, with 
the river and abundant transportation to carry his 
troops to the city of Lexington it^-lf, and land 



11 



tliem at the foot of tlie hill on which Mulligan was 
making his gallant defense, failed to send a single 
man to his assistance.^ He alleges that he gave 
orders that were not executed. It was a case in 
•which lie should have executed his own orders. 
Itwas a case in which he knewday liy day,or had 
the means of knowing, whether his orders were 
executed or not; and after the loss of a few days, 
when he found his orders were not being executed, 
it was still in his power tp take the matter in his own 
liands, and Ijy moving the troops from St. Louis 
and Jtlferson City, he could have reached Lexing- 
ton in three days by the river, reinforced Mulligan, 
and destroyed Price's army. 

A BATTLE AT LOXG RANGE — FREMONT PREPARES 
TO FIGHT PRICE AT SPRINGFIELD, WHO IS SIXTT 
MILES OFF, AT CASSVIl.LE, AND IN FULL FLIGHT. 

After the fall of Lexington he had full time to 
have rushed upon Price and destroyed him before 
he left that city, where he remained for ten days 
after its capture. Ho announced his intention to 
do so in a telegraphic dispatch to the President. 
He remained nearly a week in St. Louis after this 
announcement. He went to Jefl'erson City by 
railroad, and remained there another week; not 
leaving there with his army until Price moved off" 
leisurely from Lexington. He went then in the 
dire<;tion of Sedalia, on the Pacific railroad, and 
remained nearly another week. He then marched 
oft' to Warsaw and Springfield, and reached the 
latter place one month after leaving St. Louis, a 
distance of about one hundred and fifty miles by 
railroad, and less than a hundred and thirty by 
land. He started on his expedition with an army 
of forty thousand men, sufficient to have con- 
fronted every secessionist on the western bank of 
the Mississippi. With that army he reached 
Springfield in disorder and confusion, the divis- 
ion of General Hunter being compelled by his 
orders to make forced marches by night and day 
to relieve the panic fears of a leader wliose enemy 
was sixty miles away and in full retreat. Was 
he disturbed by thoughts of the neglected Lyon, 
or of tliat other gallant soldier who succumbed to 
famine in the trendies of Lexington, while he in- 
dulged his vanity in the pomp and parade of the 
inauguration of Benton barracks.' It is a curious 
coincidence, marking the trivial and .frivolous 
character of the man, that at the very moment 
wlien the cry of distress came witli its wildest ac- 
cents from both Wilson's Creek and Lexington, 
it was drowned by the musicof a holiday parade, 
the only warlike sound that ever smote on our 
general s ear; and it is not the less curious that he 
who could be so indifferent to the dangers that 
beset Lyon and Mulligan, should turn pale at the 
visionary terrors of the api)roach of Pric\;'s Fal- 
staffian army in buckram aiid Kendal green, 
when he was surrounded and defended by a well- 
appointed army of more than forty thousand men. 
If he had made half the haste to succor Lyon or 
to relieve Mulligan as he did in ordering up Hun- 
ter to iiis own relief, it would have been better for 
his fame, and far better for the country. Yet I 
would not impugn his personal courage. A man 
may be physically brave, but so conscious of the 
want of faculties to answer the responsibilities of 



a great occasion as to be paralyzed by it. Fre- 
mont was in consternation with such apprelicn- 
sion amid aff'airs he could not manage. 

BATTLE OF FREDERICKTON. 

In his own summing up of the results of his 
command in Missouri, he declares that it is un- 
reasonable to expect that a general shall always 
be victorious. It is equally unreasonable to ex- 
pect that our generals shall always be defeateti. 
He adds that when he had completed the organi- 
zation of his army, and got it into the fluid, and 
commenced handling it, that he was victorious at 
all points. He cites the instances of Zagonyi's 
charge at Springfield and the battle of Frederick- 
ton. Something has already been said. in this 
Hall of the battle of Frederickton. I did not 
make any observation upon it at the time, because 
I had not seen the dispatches produced by the gen- 
tleman from Indiana on that occasion. The occa- 
sion of their production was a statement made by 
the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Gurley] that the 
battlti was fought against the orders of the com- 
manding general, and that tlierefore he was not 
entitled to the credit of winning it. It would 
appear on the face of the telegraphic dispatches 
produced by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. 
Shanks] that General Fremont did not order the 
concerted movement on Frederickton, which was 
the only victory won in the hundred days in 
Missouri. The charge of Zagonyi was, in no 
sense, a victory. Zagonyi and the men under him 
made a gallant charge; they went in and came 
out very much worsted, and fell back twenty-five 
miles. There could be no result from the cliarge 
to compensate for the loss it occasioned , as Spring- 
field must necessarily have fallen without loss upon 
the approach of Fremont's overwhelming force. 
The action was brave indeed, and, the men who 
performed it deserve applause. The general who 
ordered such a sacrifice without any advantage to 
be obtained from it, deserves nothing but censure. 

The dispatches read by the gentleman from In- 
diana to-prove that General Fremont ordered the 
battle of Frederickton do not sustain tliat tiieory, 
but prove the reverse of it. The dispatches read by 
the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Gurley] establish 
the absolute truth of his statement that it was 
fought against General Fremont's orders. All of 
the dispatches taken together prove that if Fre- 
mont had not been providentially taken away from 
St. Louis, and out of the reach of the telegraph, 
he would have been without a single victory to 
illustrate his hundred days. The first dispatch is 
from Colonel Carlin, commanding at Pilot Knob, 
announcing the approach of Jeff' Thompson's 
army. I read it: ^ 

(1) [\Tn. .'■>, p. 9-1. 

(Special .'Mi'ssfiifrer.) Pilot Knob, October- 15, Ififel. 

Captain (.:. :vIcKkkveu, .//. ^. G.: 

Ji'tr Tlioiiip'-oii is lepoitrd twenty-two miles east, near 
Farmiiiytoii. I rf(|iilrc two more icijinifnts if yon can send 
them. I will attaclt liitii and t'ollow liliii up. His force is 
estiiiiat(ul at three Ilionsaiid, (3,0(10.) The telegraph is 
broken or cut, and I Tear the railroad will ho obstructed. 
CAKLIN, Colonel Commanilius;. 

The second dispatch shows tliat Fi-emont was 
out of reach of the telegraph, and was, fortunately 
for t.he country, where lie could not interfere with 
the disposition of the troops called on to aci 



12 



igainst Thompson. He was twenty-five miles 
south of Syracuse, and could only be communi- 
•,ated with by express. The date of the dispatch 
s the night of the 15th of October. I present it: 

(2) [Vol.4, p, 94. 

Syracuse, October 15, 1861. 
Captain C. McKeever, ^. ^. G. : 

Rumor reports tlio fiestruction of Ion? bridge, on Iron 
louninin road, and tlie capture by the enemy of its guard. 
Jeneral Fremont is to-niglit twenty-five miles soutli of 
ere. Dispatclies sent to me can reacii him by express from 
liis place. McKINSTRV, Brigadier General. 

The dispatches which I shall now read prove 
lat the movements which led to the defeat of 
^hompson,at Frederickton, were concerted be- 
'.veen General Curtis and Captain C. McKeever, 
'ho agreed cordially upon the measures necessary 
) be taken. The dates of these dispatclies prove 
lat Fremont had no hand in them: 
' (3) [Vol. 5, p. 100. 

i Benton B.\rracks, October 16, 1861. 

i M. McKeever, ^. ^. G?.; 

iWho commands south of St. Louis county.' Important 
Iports are coining to me. Tliompson was at Hig River 
lidge. SA.MUEL U. CURTIS, 

Jl Brigadier General Commanding. 

\ (4) [Vol. 5, p. 101. 

St. Louis, October 15, 1861. 
Igadier General Grant, Cairo, Illinois : 
leffThompson, with between two and three thousand 
Ml, is at Farinington, twenty miles east of Irontoii. Send 
large a force as you can from Cape Girardeau, in the di- 
•tioii of Ironton, or Pilot Knob, to cutofl'his retreat into 
kansas. 
ly order of Major General Fremont. 

McKEEVER, Jl. Jl. G. 

(5) [Vol. 5, p. 102. 

Camp Benton, October 16, 1861. 
McKeever, ^i. ^. G. : 

'he remainder of the (8th) eighth Wisconsin went to 
lot early this morning. Boyd's is about ready to move ; 
elayed for want of wagons, but will soon move down. 
S. R. CURTIS, Brigadier General. 

\t ( G ) [Vol. 5, p. 102. 

Camp Benton, October 16, 1861. 
McKeever, ^. ^. G.: 

ave detailed Captain Spoore'.^ company. Dodge's light 
cry, and the captain, to go forthwith. 

S. R. CURTIS, Brig. Gen. Com. 

■'idc No. 5.] (7) [Vol. 5, p. 111. 

St. Louis, Oc/ofcci-16, 1861. 
;adicr General Curtis, Benton Barracks: 
plonel Carlin is in command south of St. Louis county. 

headquarters are at Pilot Knob. Send six days' pro- 
'>iis Willi Colonel Boyd's regiment. Have the remain- 
•^ompanios of the eighth Wisconsin left this morning? 
tnpsoii is at Farinington. .\iiswer how soon troops can 

I depot. C. McKEEVER, ^. .4. G. 

'irfe No. 6^ (8) [Vol.5, p. 111. 

' St. Louis, October 16, 1861. 

adier General Curtis, Benton Barracks : 

ive one of the companies of light artillery under your 

iiand equipped immediatrly. You will make requisi- 

upon Major .'^lleii and Captain Callender for everything 

Is nc!CKssary. Please notify me which company you 

id equipping. 

I order of Genera! Fremont. 

I C. McKEEVER, ^. ^. G. 

he next dispatch is from General Fremont, 
■Cinstry's express having reached him and 
ighi back iiis orders. Forlunately they came 



too late to make another Springfield or Lexington 
at Frederickton: 

Headquarters, October 21, 1861. 
To Brigadier General Curtis : 

Orderall the troops that you have sent on the Iron Mount- 
ain road back to Benton jjarracks. The whole affair has 
been grossly exaggerated. Colonel Carlin should have kept 
the road open without any additional force. 

By order of Major General Frrmont. 

C. McKEEVER, ^. ^. j?. G. 

The querulous tone of this dispatch proves that 
it emanated from the commanding general, who 
never thought anybody to bo in danger but him- 
self. It could not have been McKeever's, because 
he iiad concerted the movements with Curtis which 
led to the sending of the reinforcements counter- 
manded by Fremont. 1 read another dispatch an- 
nouncing the victory: 

Headquarters, October 23, 1861. 
To Brigadier General Curtis, Benton Barracks : 

Colonel Carlin left Pilot Knob Sunday. Attacked the 
enemy yesterday and routed liitn. The eighth Wisconsin 
and Colonel Boyd's Missouri volunteers will remain for the 
present at Pilot Knob. You will order Colonel St. James 
with his command to return immediately to Benton bar- 
racks. Orders will be issued at once sending his regiment 
forward to Tipton. 

By order: C. McKEEVER, ^5. ^. ^. G. 

A singular fact in connection with this transac- 
tion which deserves mention is, that the dispatch 
to Curtis, countermanding the reinforcements is 
not to be found in the whole batch produced by 
the gentleman from Indiana; each of which has 
the mark of the folio of Fremont's order-book 
attached to it, showing who furnished them, for 
the purpose of appropriating to General Fremont 
the honors of that victory. The dispatch to Cur- 
tis is discreetly left out. May we not presume 
that the man who suppressed that dispatch might 
overlook others calculated to throw light on the 
other events of the " hundred days." The dis- 
patch to Curtis was given to me by that gentle- 
man with his own hand; I use it now, that honor 
may be given where honor is due. 

THE ARMY CREATED BY FREMONT. 

We have heard much in this House and out of 
it of the great army which General Fremont cre- 
ated, and of the enthusiasm which he inspired. I 
had thought that the people of the West had vol- 
unteered for the defense of the cause. When the 
President made his first call for " three mouths" 
volunteers, the quota was filled to overflowing in 
the West. The second call was filled up before 
General Fremont's reluctant footsteps were lured 
back from France by the offer of a major general- 
ship. Everjr call made on the people of the West 
has been filled, and the acceptance of more men 
was refused by the Government. But the idoia- 
tors of General Fremont will have it that iiis pop- 
ularity alone created our western nriny, and that 
the Governors and people of Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Missouri, and the entire Northwest have no 
merit at all in this matter; but when we have been 
forced by the clamors of his partisans almost to 
admit that he alone raised this vast army, and 
when we beheld with our eyes their gallant ar« 
ray, as wc did on the grand flotilla which bore 
him and them to Cairo, when the pleading for suc- 
cor fell sadly on our cars before the battle of Wil- 
son's Creck,.and as we did, also, at that splendid 



13 



pagciiut whicli commcinoiated the inauguration of 
Bciitoii barracks, at the very iiour when iIk; boom- 
ing cannon sliook tlie resounding liills at Lexing- 
ton, and when we ask why were these brave men 
not permitted to succor tlieir brothers and carry 
our banners to victory upon the stricken fields of 
Wilson's Creek and Lexington, instead of min- 
istering to tlie pride and vainglory of our chief, 
then we are told that liiesc long and splendid lines 
of troops, who marched before ourown eyes to the 
sound of martial music and with flaunting flags, 
were not men, they were jihantoms; the gay flo- 
tilla "a painted ship upon a painted ocean;" and 
the clang of arms, which made the breast of more 
than one burly brigadier swell with pride, and 
paled the cheek of beauty at Benton barracks, was 
a mere imagination of men, and a thing unreal. 

Now, sir, he did have the troops, but he did 
not know how to use them. He did not create 
these troops. Most of them were enlisted before 
his feet touched the shores of America on his re- 
turn from Europe. Missouri overflowed her quota. 
I have seen men in Missouri after he arrived there, 
high men, too, coming to him with offers of regi- 
ments, and they were elbowed out of the way by 
his lackeys and orderlies. They were made to 
give way to the California cormorants. The army 
that he raised was that army of contractors who 
settled down upon us like obscene birds of prey 
upon a carcass. They elbowed everybody else 
out of the way, and unfortunately for him and the 
country, engrossed his time and attention. I sup- 
pose that there are no men in America whose char- 
acters are so bad as the men who were his famil- 
iars and associates. Of course, I do not refer to 
the gentlemen who were near hitn, of whom there 
were many on his stafl'; very many of them were 
most honorable men, whose only motives were to 
serve the country and to serve him, and among 
that number I take pleasure in distinguishing the 
gentleman from Indiana. My allusion is directed 
to those who sought him for the sake of contracts. 
Those of his aids-de-camp who did get contracts 
were the worst of all. 

1 IS ST. LOUIS A REBELLIOUS CITY.' 

-» I desire, in this place, although somewhatoutof 
place in the line of my remarks, to refer, for a mo- 
ment, to an allusion in the speech of the gentle- 
man from Indiana, to the efl'ect that St. Louis was 
seething with treason when Frcmontarrived there. 
The general himself stigmatizes St. Louis as a re- 
bellious city, over which he was compelled to es- 
tablish martial law, and reoort to the most stringent 
measures to prevent the secessionists from taking 
the town. These statements are made in utter ig- 
norance of affairs in St. Louis. Thecity and county 
of St. Louis voted for Abraham Lincoln for Presi- 
dent by a large majority, and almost all the votes 
of the minority were given for Douglas. The vote 
for Breckinridge did not number one thousand, in 
a total vote of more thaii twenty thousand. I ven- 
ture the assertion that, at the time General Fre- 
mont came to the city, there were not a thousand 
secessionists there. They had the whole winter, 
with the State and national Governments in their 
favor, to raise and arm men for the secession cause, 
and yet they raised only two meager regiments- 



the other troops captured with these two regi- 
ments atCamp Jackson, iiy General Lyon, on the 
10th of May, came from the interior of the State. 
The secessionists arc found among the would-be 
respectable peoiile, and a few other thoughtless 
persons, led by these upstarts; but when the call 
to arms was made in support of the Union cause, 
ten thousand men volunteered in St. Louis in two 
weeks, and ton thousand more would have ofl'ered 
if they could have been accepted. No congress- 
ional district in the Union has given so maliy sol- 
diers to the Union cause as the city and county of 
St. Louis. St.Louisarebelliouscity! Therenever 
was a greater slander uttered by any man. Some 
of the rich men were, as he said, secessionists, but 
the working men, the mechanics and the great 
body of the people, nine tenths of them, were for 
the Union, and ready to bear arms in its defense. 
The declaration of martial law by General Fremont 
was the ofi'spring of timidity, seeking to prevent 
imaginary dangers by inspiring the terrors with 
which he himself was haunted. The robust cour- 
age of Lyon failed to sec any efficacy in martial 
law, even whtn the traitors were openly congre- 
gating in Camp Jackson. He relied on his own 
courage and the valor of his soldiers. The people 
of that city took up arms, when they were not 
permitted to bear commissions, but the men who 
bore arms for their country without commissions 
from anybody, sustained the power of the Gov- 
ernment in the State of Missouri. If they had 
waited for commissions, anarmed miudrity would 
have trampled down the authority of the Govern- 
ment there, as was done in many, if not all, of the 
southern States. It can be said of St. Louis, what 
cannot be said of any city in a slave State, that the 
arsenal of the United States and the United States 
treasury were saved to the Government by its loyal 
citizens, while the Stale and national governments 
were conspiring for their capture. 
Fremont's contrjvct for the fortifications. 
I return to the point I was discussing before 
this digression on the subject of the loyalty of St. 
Louis demanded that I should say a few words 
in defense of the patriotism of its citizens. Gen- 
eral Fremont approaches the subject of contracts 
with rather more of confusion in his manner than 
characterizes the rest of his statement. In respect to 
the Beard contract, he makes use of some remark- 
able language-. Among other things, with regard 
to this contract, when speaking of its treatment in 
the report of the Van Wyck committee, he says: 
" Coiiceriiing the contract for tliis work tin; committee of 
I invcsli>;;ition say lli.il it w;is iiiade iimler the ' special order 
1 and direction of General Fremont,' and Concerning the pay- 
ments thatthey were made upon his ' personal order.' The 
foUowins; extract will show that not only was I recognized 
to have this power, but that I was, so laic as the 3d of Sep- 
ternher, counseled to exercise it by the Quartermaster Gen- 
eral, General .Meigs." » 

Here is the counsel of duartcrmaster General 
Meigs, which he quotes: 

Letters of the Hon. M. Blair, P. M. G. 

'• Washington. Scptemhcr 3, ISGl. 

"Meigs begged inc this afternoon to get you to order fif- 
teen-inch guns from riltsburg for your gunboats. He says 
that the boats can empty any battery the enemy can make 
with such guns, lie advises that you coniraet i«)r them di- 
rectly yourself, telling the contractor you will direct your 
urdnaiiuo offlcor to pay (br tliem," 



14 



duartermaster General Meigs counsels him to 
buy fifteen-inch guns. For what? For his gun- 
boats. And this he construes as authority to erect 
fortifications around St. Louis, forgetful of the 
order of tiie Secretary of War to stop the erection 
of these same fortifications, and make no further 
payment on account of them, which order he set 
at defiance, and continued the construction of the 
forts, and ordered the payment of $60,000 on them 
to be made by Major Allen, as is clearly shown 
by the testimony of that officer in the very report 
upon which he was commenting. What is still 
more singular is, that when the committee were 
charging that this was a case of gross fraud upon 
the Government, and not laying so much stress 
upon his want of authority, that he should setup 
his power to make the contract instead of vindi- 
cating its fairness. The contract, by its terms, re- 
quires that the forts shall be built in five days. It 
is proven , and admitted by General Fremont, that 
he set Beard to work upon them as soon as he 
(Beard) arrived in St. Louis from California. The 
first payment on account of the forts was made to 
Beard on tlie 29th of August; tlie contract was 
dated on the 25th of September. It is shown by 
the testimony that Beard had been working for 
twenty-five days on the forts before the contract 
was signed, which contract required him to com- 
plete them in five days. It is proven that the forts 
were not completed on the 14th of October, when 
the Secretary of War ordered Fremont to stop the 
work on them. -The work continued. How long 
Beard was in completing them, I do not know. I 
liave been informed that they were not completed 
on the 1st of November. 

Thus it is estaljlished that Beard was working 
for six weeks, and probably for two months, on 
a job which he had stipulated to finish in five days. 
rThe factof his havingbeen employed in construct- 
ing these forts for six weeks, is brought home to 
the knowledge of General Fremont; the stipula- 
tion toco mjilete them in five daysv/as the colorable 
pretext merely for the enormous prices paid him 
for the job. Beard built five of the forts; five others 
were built under the superintendence of Major 
Kappner, he employing and paying the laborers. 
The five built by Kappner cost $60,000, and were 
one fifth larger than the five built by Beard, who 
received in money $171,000, and received orders 
upon the quartermaster, signed by General Fre- 
mont, for $75,000 more; making in all $246,000. 
Tiie committee in their report say: 

" It will be seen, therefore, tlio total amount ordered to be 
paid to IJeurd, on account oftlicse works, by General Fre- 
mont, was ,^346,000, or which .'5171,000 was actually paid. 
Tlirougli the firnintss of Major Allen, who appears to he a 
vigilant anil incorruptible guardian of the pul)lic interest, 
this last amount of $60,000 was saved from going into the 
capacious and already gorged pocket of Beard, who, in the 
language of Major Allen, was the ' le.ider among the eon- 
traetors,J anil perhaps ' tlie most extravagant and grasping 
of them all.' " 

The committee say further: 

" There is, however, another way of testing the character 
of this contract. The five forts built by Major Kappner, 
by days' work, which would ordinarily be the most expens- 
ive way, cost the sum of j^SOjOOO, while they were one 
fifth larger cm an average than the five built by Beard. Ma- 
jor Kappner testifies positively that the five forts built by 
Beard woifld certairdy not cost more than $60,000, which 
the five forts cost that he built. Allowing to Beard the lib- 



eraj estimate that the cost of building the five forts which 
he constructed was $60,000, he has already obtained from 
the Treasury of the United States the profit of $111,000; 
and had the additional amount of $7.5,000 been paid him, 
which General Fremont had ordered to be paid, the Gov- 
ernment would have been defrauded in that one transaction 
out of the enormous sum of .§176,000. 

" From the fact that the contract with Beard was entered 
into 30 long alter the work had been commenced by him it 
has the appearaacc that it was really intended to cover all 
the work on all the forts— that done by Major Kappner by 
days' work as well as by himself— for the purpose of en- 
abling him to obtain pay for the whole at the extravagant 
and outrageous prices provided for in liis contract. It is 
but justice to General McKinstry to state that he is not re- 
sponsible for this contract. It was made at headquarters, 
and the enormous and unconscionable prices were there 
fixed upon between General FrCMnont and the contractor, 
and the payments made by him on the contract were made 
by the express direction of General Fremont. He acted 
for the conmianding general, and by his direction. Beard 
brought to him a paper from headquarters, ' formally drawn 
up,' which contained the prices. (See Clement's testi- 
mony, p. 885.) Me objected to the prices, and ' greatly re- 
duced them.' If the prices nanuHl in thecontract wure the 
' reduced ' prices, it would l)e a matter of curiosity to know 
what the original prices were as sent from lieadquarlers." 

I cannot forbear another quotation from the 
report of the committee: 

" The money appropriated by Congress to subsist and 
clothe and transport our armies was thus, in utter con- 
tempt of all law and of the Army regulations, as well as in 
utter defiance of superior authority, ordered to be diverted 
from its lawful purpose, and turned over to the cormorant. 
Beard. While he had received .*171,000 from the Govern- 
ment, it will be seen from the testimony of Major Kappner 
that there liad only been paid to the honest German la- 
borers, who did the work on the first five forts built under 
his direction, the sum of .'5'15,500, leaving from forty to fifty 
thousand dollars still their due. And while these laborers, 
whose families were clamoring for bread, were besieging 
the quartermaster's department for their [lay, this rapacious 
contractor, Beard, with ,*171,000 in his pocket, is found fol- 
lowing up the army, aiul in the confidence of the major 
general, who gives Jiim orders for large purchases, which 
only could have been legally made through the quartermas- 
ter's department, and wliich afforded him further opportu- 
nities for still plundering the Government." 

I can only add to this, that the laboring men 
who did the work for Beard went without their 
money as well as those who did the work under 
Kappner. Dozens of them came to my house to 
ask how they should get their money, and as I 
was not as well acquainted with Beard as General 
Fremont appears to be, from his statcuKint, and 
had not the same confidence in him as the general 
declared that he had, I could not answer their 
questions. 

The above quotations show what was the grava- 
men of the charge made by the committee, and I 
regard it as a most singular answer to this charge 
that Q,uartermastcr General Meigs had recom- 
mended him to purchase fiCteen-inch guns for his 
gunboats. 

G0XBOATS ON THE WESTERN RIVERS. 

This allusion to gunboats, however, reminds 
me of the declaration made by the gentleman from 
Indiana, [Mr. Shanks,] and many times repeated 
in his speech, in praise of the forethought and en- 
ergy of Fremont in ordering and constructing the 
gunboats on the western waters. The gentleman 
sa^s they were a part of Fremont's plan, and ori- 
ginated by him. Now, sir, I am compelled to slate, 
in vindication of the truth of history, that Fremont 
did not order the gunboats, and that the jilaii did 
not originate with him. They were ordered be- 



lt> 



fore he cnmo bark from Europe. The Govern- 
ment had determined upon the plan, and tlie ad- 
vertisements for jiroposals were publislied before 
he readied tlie siiores of America. Tiicy were 
intended for McCielhin wlien he was in command 
of that dejiartmont. The idea of the mortar boats 
originated witii Captain Fox, Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy, to whom tlie whole merit of their 
plan is justly due. 

COMBINATION AND CONSPIRACY. 

The gentleman from Indiana is haunted with 
the idea of an awful combination against the 
"champion of freedom." There is scarcely a 
paragraph in his speech in which this combination 
does not crop out. He classifies the parties to 
that combination or conspiracy, and goes over it 
again and again in "damnable iteration," show- 
ing that it had made a great impression on his 
mind, and that he actually believed in it. Parties 
tothis " unholy alliance" consisted of pm-slavory 
men, jealous politicians looking to the Presi- 
dency, West Pointers, and contractors. I do not 
know in which of these classes the gentleman has 
placed me. I am inclined to think that I am left 
out altogether. My op|)osition to slavery has been 
tried and proven in a more severe ordeal than any 
through which the gentleman from Indiana or 
General Fremont have ever been called on to pass. 
It has been tested in worse plalfes and in worse 
times than ei4,her of them have ever'cxperienced. 
I have sealed my devotion to that cause by. quite 
as many sacrifices as the gentlemaw from Indiana, 
or his friend General Fremont. «([ intend, s» far 
as I can, under the Constitution of my couhtry, 
to continue my hostility to the institution of sla- 
. very. I shall oppose, as I have always opposed, 
its existence in the State in which I live;»and if 
any mode, under the Constitution, can be c^fvised 
by which the institution^ of slavery can be obliter- 
ated from all the States in the Union, I shall be 
among thafiist to sujiport that mcaswft'e; but I 
will not aid in breaking down the Constitution 
even to destroy slavery. I consider the Constitu- 
tion of more value to me and to my children than 
any other earthly possession. ' 

During the pendency of the present struggle, I 
have taken upon myself some slight hazards in its 
defense, and will never be found enrolled among 
its enemies and violators, no matter from what 
quarter they may come. I understand that by 
pro-slavery men the gentleman means to designate 
those who opposed the proclamation of General 
Fremont. I cr>n say that I did not see anything 
very bad in that nroclamaiion. Nobody paid much 
attention to it in Missouri, where it really liad little 
or no effect. Everybody understood very well that 
it was not intended for that meridian, but that it 
was put out for a campaign in New England and 
elsewhere. It was not intended to operate upon 
the theater of war, where its only effect would be 
to make the rebels fight more desperately to save 
their property and negroes; it was rather intended 
for a political campaign in which the general had 
embarked, and in which he hoped for better suc- 
cess than had attended his arms. Tlie net results 
of this bombastic proclamation was the loss of Ivvo 
armies and the liberation of two negroes — negroes 



that did not belong to the man from whom they 
were taken, but to his wife, to whom they were 
secured by a marriage contract. The deeds of 
emancipation which he gave to these two negro 
men were intended to point an electioneering doc- 
ument. In the course that I have thought proper 
to pursue towards General Fremont, 1 believe I 
am uninfluenced by any sentiment of jealousy. I 
have heretofore given him a very cordial support 
for every position to which he has aspired, and I 
am unconsciousof ever having experienced a feel- 
ing of jealQusy to anyone, ^here is certainly 
nothing in General Fremont's present position to 
inspire any one with jealousy. I am neither aWest 
Pointer nor a contractor, and do not feel myself in- 
cluded in the conspiracy, which the imagination 
of the gentleman from Indiana has conjured up. 

WHY FREMONT WAS REMOVED. 

My belief is that the President was operated 
upon in the removal of General Fremont by his 
own judgment upon events which transpired in 
Missouri. Before General Fremont took com- 
mand in that department uninterrupted success at- 
tended the standard of the Union. The first blow 
which was struck for the Government was given 
in Missouri; the first successes of the cause were 
won upon the soil of that State. Camp Jackson, 
Booneville, and Carthage, made the names of Lyon 
and Sigel historic, and gilded the cloud of disaster 
which had settled upon our arms elsewhere. The 
welcome which greeted the advent of Fremont had 
hardly ceased to sound before the cry of distress 
broke upon our ears. Humiliation, disaster, de- 
feat, and disgrace, came with him, remained with 
him, and went away with him and his army of 
contractors. 

As soon as the paralyzing influence of his im- 
becility was removed victory came back to the 
standard of the Union in the West, and the ad- 
vancing columns of our victorious armies have 
penetrated to the very heart of the rebellion, in- 
flicting blows from which it lies writhing in death, 
and from which it can never recover. 

I believe it is the judgment of mankind that 
there is no such thing as an unfortunate great 
man. A man to be great must be able to do great 
things with small means; and when we hear of a 
fellow going whimpering around the country try- 
ing to give the reasons for his being whipped, the 
spectacle may excite sympathy, he may even be 
regarded as a very good man, but nobody will 
ever select him as a lit person to fight battles and 
tpcarry on war. 

r'l'he admirers of General Fremont say that he 
w*uld have won a victory if he had been permitted 
to remain in command. The world would have 
more confidence if he had given any proof of his 
capacity by winning victories when he had a 
command. It was with great difficulty that the 
order for General Fremont's removal was carried 
through his lines. A messenger who bore the 
dispatch passed through his lines by a ruse, as I 
am given to understand, and delivered it to Gen- 
eral Fremont. 

ALL THE MUTINY OF HIS OWN MAKING. 

The newspapers that were in his interest in St. 
Louis announced that, when the intelligence of 



16 



his removal was made known, there was a mutiny 
in the army, and that there was a meeting of offi- 
cers, especially of those whose commissions ex- 
pired with the end of his service in the depart- 
ment; that they gathered around him, and shouted 
" Hurrah for Fremont, and down with Hunter!" 
His friends say that he usi'd his potent influence 
to put down this terrible mutiny. There was no 
mutiny that was not of his own making. The 
press in St. Louis, in his interest and under his 
control, ihsti*at|d mutiny, and promoted it by 
every species of influence they could bring to bear; 
by misrepresentations of the grossest character^ 
by appeals to the pride and passions of tiie men. 
The general himself permitted it by not pre- 
venting it_r3lf he did anything to quell the mu- 
tiny, it was only when he found that it did not 
extend beyond a few of his own dependents and 



retainers, and that the army had risen in defense 
of tl^country and not to put him above the coun- 
try. rThe conduct of his nearest and most trusted 
frienQs,find the conduct of the press, which had 
only spoken during his administration of the de- 
partment as he dictated, proved most conclusively 
that he would have defied the Government and 
retained the command, if he had dared to do so.""! 

The fact that his friends applaud him, even f(5r 
yielding his command when ordered to do so by 
the Government, shows how little margin there 
is for praise when such an act, under such cir- 
cumstances, is extolled. But as little as there is 
to exalt in liis enforced obedience to what he could 
not and dared not resist, yet it was the most com- 
mendable act, after all, of his administration, * 

" Notliing in life [official life] so became liim 
As tlie leaving it." 



\ 



LB D '05 



1 



kS 



